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Abstract: The paper considers the nature and extent of mental disorder, amongst those who 
have been justly convicted, within prisons in England and Wales.  These levels of disorder, and 
of serious disorder, are broadly consistent with the international literature.  The implications of 
the presence of so many mentally disordered offenders for the established purposes of 
imprisonment are explored.  Issues of accessing appropriate treatment are reviewed. A number 
of remedies are discussed, including those of interventions which would significantly reduce 
the prison population per se.  The paper concludes that whilst for many mentally disordered 
offenders imprisonment is the right and proper disposal, for others it is an injustice that they 
are detained in conditions that may exacerbate their disorders, and for some others their 
presence in the prison population is a manifest injustice. The paper calls for a fundamental 
review of the purposes of imprisonment for all offenders, in the light of these observations 
about mentally disordered offenders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
* Professor of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science. This is a longer version of my 
public lecture at the LSE given in Conor Gearty’s Law Matters series on 16 October 2013. I am very 
grateful for the expert commentary given then by Anita Dockley, the Howard League’s Research Director 
and Dr Tim Exworthy, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist and a Visiting Senior Lecturer at the Institute of 
Psychiatry, King’s College London. I am also grateful for a number of insightful questions from the 
audience.  Nicola Lacey kindly also read an earlier version of this longer paper and her comments were, as 
ever, remarkably helpful. 
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In 1996 Sir David Ramsbotham observed: 
 
 There is particularly urgent need for increased provision for the care of those 
with mental health problems, who make up a larger proportion of the prison 
population than they would of any other group in the community. What is 
more, prison can exacerbate mental health problems, which has a long-term 
impact on the individual concerned and the community into which he or she 
may be released (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 1996:5).1  
 
Given that this situation persists into our current prison population, and has 
proved remarkably resilient to change over the last two decades, can it be 
described as a manifest injustice to imprison those with mental disorder?   
 
 
 
ESTABLISHING BOUNDARIES 
 
Whilst my starting point is to question the justness of imprisoning those with 
mental disorder, it is important to set out what I will not be tackling.   
First, this paper does not concern the justness of imprisoning those whose 
mental disorder may have caused or contributed in a significant way to their 
offending. For these individuals questions can readily be raised about whether 
their culpability should be substantially reduced or indeed extinguished as a result 
of their mental disorder. Answering these questions is more problematic since the 
issue of causation is frequently difficult to establish in individual cases and the 
empirical literature generally is contested.  I have written about this at length 
elsewhere (Peay 2011). And the Law Commission, in its ongoing programme of 
work on unfitness to plead, automatism and the special verdict of not guilty by 
reason of insanity, has also addressed the problems in detail.2   
Rather, my primary focus relates to those who have been justly convicted. Is 
it then unjust to subject those individuals with mental disorder to imprisonment 
given the possibility, sometimes probability, that imprisonment will either result in 
their disorder not receiving the quality of treatment they could have received had 
they not been imprisoned, or exacerbate their disorder or possibly even, in some 
vulnerable individuals, elicit mental disorder?  Indeed, is it unjust to imprison 
those on whom the psychological consequences of imprisonment are 
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending in which they have engaged? 
Do such emotional costs get lost in the evaluation of what is just because they are 
                                                     
1 The terms of reference were ‘[T]o consider health care arrangements in Prison Service establishments in 
England and Wales with a view to ensuring that prisoners are given access to the same quality and range 
of health care services as the general public receives from the National Health Service’. 
2 See http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/, last accessed on 16 January 2014.  
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so much harder to measure, or are they regarded as a legitimate, albeit regrettable, 
side-effect of the proportionate deprivation of liberty?3 
Second, I will not be concerned with the lawfulness of the imprisonment of 
those with mental disorder. Under Article 5 of the ECHR it is lawful to detain 
people who have been convicted by a competent court (5(1)(a)), and lawful to 
detain in anticipation of a criminal trial where there is reasonable suspicion that an 
offence has been committed, or that another will be committed, or that the person 
will flee before trial (hence the need for remand in custody; Article 5(1)(c)): and it 
is lawful to detain persons of unsound mind under either provision.  The ECHR 
makes further provision to detain lawfully persons of unsound mind where they 
do not fall into these categories; but here the detention has to take place in an 
appropriate environment – that is, a psychiatric institution and not a prison (Aerts 
v Belgium 1998).   
Similarly, whilst the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.142(1) sets out a number of 
purposes of sentencing to which sentencers must have regard, namely:  
 
(a) the punishment of offenders, 
(b) the reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence), 
(c) the reform and rehabilitation of offenders, 
(d) the protection of the public, and 
(e) the making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their     
offences. 
 
s.142(2)(d) states that when a court chooses to make an order under the Mental 
Health Act 1983 to otherwise dispose of a mentally disordered offender to 
hospital, then these purposes of sentence do not apply.  And from that it can be 
inferred that they do apply when sentencing a mentally disordered offender under 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
Third, I will not be exploring the concept of justice. Suffice it to say that our 
conceptions of what is unjust may be easier to determine than what is just.  As 
Tony Bottoms (1998) memorably observed, desert is an asymmetrical concept. 
Thus, we can probably all agree that the image of the frankly psychotic individual 
chained in a dungeon, even if he or she has committed an offence of the most 
heinous nature, would probably stick in our respective craws as morally unjust.  
But would we, and/or do we, have the same response to the image of a 
personality disordered offender detained in a modern prison (clean, well lit, with 
appropriate in-reach medical services reaching the equivalent standard to that 
available in the outside community)? Does that strike us as unjust?  Probably not.  
And if that individual has been subject to a fair trial, with representation, leading 
to a finding of guilt in front of 12 jurors and where sentence has followed, 
imposed by a judge who has heard evidence in mitigation of the offender’s 
personality disorder, we would probably regard their sentence as just. And 
                                                     
3 A point explicitly raised by Nicola Lacey. 
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particularly so if we can answer satisfactorily the prior question about whether 
they would have offended but for their disorder.  But what of an offender whose 
underlying disorder may have contributed in some way to their offending but who 
is then held in conditions in prison where access to adequate treatment for that 
disorder is problematic?  Or where prison exacerbates an underlying condition not 
related to the offender’s offending? Those are more difficult cases.   
Fourth, my argument about potential injustice lies primarily in the realms of 
contravening widely held public values – those of compassion for the sick and 
disabled, and of support for the needy.  I start from the position that this is not 
controversial. Whilst punitive values undoubtedly inform some elements of public 
opinion with respect to offenders generally, research has repeatedly shown a more 
understanding approach to the sentencing of individual offenders once more is 
known about those offenders and about the efficacy of the various interventions 
made in the name of punishment (Roberts et al 2012, Roberts et al 2009). Notably, 
in the 2009 research, 61% of the public responded that, when sentencing someone 
being treated for depression at the time of the offence, the offender should receive 
a more lenient sentence in some cases, with 15% saying this should happen in 
most or all cases. Indeed, politicians of all complexions will refer to ‘the mentally 
disordered’ as a group worthy of an alternative approach to mere imprisonment 
when responding to questions about prison overcrowding: and our political 
leaders are not noted for their inclination to go against perceived public opinion. 
In short, my approach will be consequentialist – do good outcomes ensue from 
imprisoning the mentally disordered; and virtue-based – can we learn to do better 
in this field? 
Finally, in terms of my boundary issues, there is an existing literature on what 
is known as ‘impact’ in sentencing. Christine Piper (2007) and Susan Easton 
(2008) have contested the issues and very helpfully laid the ground for further 
work.  As yet, the Sentencing Council have not provided any systematic guidelines 
beyond what is available in their individual offence guidelines and in the guideline 
‘Seriousness’ which deals with the principles underpinning the determination of 
seriousness.4  But beyond being required to have regard to the guidelines and the 
statutory framework, sentencers have a complete discretion to mitigate sentence as 
they see fit.5  It is perhaps understandable that the Sentencing Council have been 
reluctant to tackle this tricky area since impact in sentence can take on a relatively 
wide meaning; that is, any individual factor which may make imprisonment 
exceptionally harsh and, thus, any given sentence length disproportionate in the 
way in which it is subjectively experienced by the offender. The literature 
distinguishes between these factors and those which generally impact negatively on 
the whole prison population: for example, dreadful prison conditions have already 
been recognised by a former Lord Chief Justice, Sir Igor Judge, to be a factor that 
                                                     
4 Available at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/, last accessed on 16 January 2014. 
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sentencers ought to take into account when determining the appropriate punitive 
value of a sentence.6 Whilst mental disorder is clearly one such factor that affects 
individuals, it is the assertion of this paper that the incidence is widespread (which 
would urge restraint in sentencing generally) and that its manifestations affect 
different offenders with different diagnoses in different ways (which would urge 
further mitigation with respect to individuals).  
Given that this paper arose from a lecture in a series entitled ‘Law Matters’, it 
is worth stressing that it concludes that there are significant elements of injustice 
in the imprisonment of those with mental disorder, albeit arguably not injustice 
that could properly be described as manifest.  And it arrives at that conclusion 
through a series of steps.  First, it considers the nature and extent of mental 
disorder amongst the imprisoned population. Second, it briefly reviews the 
conditions and risks of imprisonment with respect to humane and safe 
confinement.  Third, it examines whether the purposes of imprisonment are 
jeopardised by the preponderance of mental disorder and its nature amongst those 
imprisoned.  And fourth, it reviews the nature of treatment for mental disorder in 
prison and the dynamic relationship between treatment in prison, treatment in 
hospital and the coercive consequences of that relationship. And it concludes by 
asserting that since mentally disordered offenders are not some easily identifiable 
or small group within the prison population, we ought to rethink the nature of our 
prototypical offender. And in so doing, reflect upon the relative unattainability of 
the stated purposes of imprisonment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 See his address to the Prisoners’ Education Trust in 2007, reported at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-491745/Overcrowded-prisons-justify-lesser-sentences-
criminals-says-judge.html, last accessed on 16 January 2014. 
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THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF IMPRISONMENT OF THOSE 
WITH MENTAL DISORDER 
 
Table from Fazel and Baillargeon (2010) Table 1 p.958 Prevalence of mental disorders in 
prisoners in western countries in comparison with the general population. 
 
 
 
The data above from Fazel and Baillargeon’s table are based on analyses of a 
number of publications with large scale survey data of imprisonment in western 
countries compared with the general population.  Three issues are of particular 
note.  First, the raised levels of the most series forms of mental illness; these pose 
stark questions about the satisfactoriness of the prior demonstration of criminal 
responsibility given uncertainty about the offender’s capacity (albeit that some 
incidents of disorder will have arisen post-conviction). Second, the most striking 
disparity in the figures relates to diagnoses of personality disorder (which now do 
come under the Mental Health Act’s definition of mental disorder) and of anti-
social personality disorder with respect to female offenders. Where a diagnosis 
partially embraces behaviours that are in themselves criminal, there is likely to be 
significant overlap between the populations. However, given this overlap, 
questions about treatment interventions become more problematic since it is not 
always clear if treatment addresses the underlying disorder or the criminality.  
Indeed, such disorders are not easy to treat.  Ironically, personality disordered 
offenders will most probably have had full capacity for their offending.  Third, the 
high levels of drug misuse/dependence, which do not fall per se under the Mental 
Health Act’s definition of mental disorder. 
  
Jill Peay                                                      Imprisoning the Mentally Disordered: A Manifest Injustice?  
 
 7
To those familiar with the field there is nothing unusual in these figures.  
Over time or over countries, the problem of the over-representation of those with 
mental disorder in prison populations has been well known. Gluek’s study in 1918 
in the US established this, and in the UK, Gunn et al’s work in 1978 (see also 
Gunn et al 1991) is definitive.  But the international figures are undoubtedly 
striking. 
These figures are also supplemented by those in the Singleton et al study 
(1998).  The real problem in England and Wales is that there is no recent or 
proper update of this data. As the Ministry of Justice has observed ‘The 
proportions of mentally ill in the prison population are not measured routinely so 
the actual change over time is unknown’ (MOJ 2013a:10). This is one of a number 
of areas where we do not collect the relevant data so we cannot draw valid 
conclusions. 
The Singleton et al (1998) study of psychiatric morbidity in prisoners in 
England and Wales is hardly recent. Based on research in 1997 Singleton et al 
found personality disorder in the sentenced population at 64% male, 50% female; 
functional psychotic disorders in the last year at 7% male, 14% female; depressive 
episodes in past week 8% male, 15% female (and any neurotic disorder 40% male, 
63% female); only 34% of male and 45% of female prisoners had not used drugs 
in the year before prison; perhaps most worryingly for issues of ‘just convictions’, 
5% of the male and 9% of the female population fell at 25 or below on the Quick 
test of intellectual functioning, that is at the lowest level.  In total, only 1 in 10 of 
the prison population showed no evidence of any of the five mental disorders 
assessed (psychosis, neurosis, personality disorder, and alcohol or drug 
dependence). 
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Table 2 adapted from Singleton et al 1998 (note the figures here are significantly higher for 
functional psychosis and intellectual disability than in the Fazel and Baillargeon paper above) 
 
 
Similarly, work by Fazel and Seewald (2012), who used 109 samples based on 24 
countries involving 33,588 prisoners, found a pooled prevalence of 3.6% 
psychosis in male prisoners and 3.9% psychosis in female prisoners. This was 
consistent with earlier findings: e.g. Fazel and Danesh (2002) of 62 prison studies, 
which also found 10% of male and 12% of female offenders suffering from 
depression; and 47% fulfilled the criteria for antisocial personality disorder.   
Thus, even assuming that in England and Wales we are only average for 
psychosis in our prison population this would mean, of a population of say 75,899 
convicted prisoners, some 2,732 people with functional psychosis in prison.7  There 
is thus a well-documented and persistent overrepresentation of people with what 
everyone would agree to be mental illness – madness – in its most acute form. 
Sirdifield et al’s 2009 review of more internationally based literature finds high 
rates of co-morbidity – indeed Brooker et al (2002) found that as many as 12-15% 
prisoners have 4 or 5 co-existing mental disorders.  Again, given the complexities 
of diagnosing mental disorder, and the increasing evidence that mental illnesses are 
not discrete entities but are spectrum based, this should come as no surprise 
(Adam 2013). 
                                                     
7 This assumes a 3.6% prevalence – a conservative estimate on figures above. 
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The more difficult statistics relate to the significant levels of mental disorder 
generally in the prison population. If only 1 in 10 of our prison population in the 
Singleton et al (1998) study showed no evidence of mental disorder in its broadest 
form, then the argument that is set out below is not one based on the need for 
exceptional measures with respect to those with mental disorder: it is an argument 
that applies to 90% of the prison population. In essence, mental disorder is 
commonplace in prison populations, severe mental disorder and those with 
complex mental health needs form a significant proportion of the sentenced 
prison population.  And this is something that really should make us reflect on the 
nature and purposes of imprisonment. 
But before I turn directly to that part of the argument, there are three further 
issues that need to be addressed, all of which relate to keeping prisoners in safe, 
appropriate and humane conditions.  And all three issues apply with greater force 
to those with mental disorder. 
 
 
 
THE CONDITIONS OF IMPRISONMENT 
 
(i) KEEPING THE PRISON POPULATION SAFE 
 
The conditions of detention are relevant not to the legitimacy of the conviction, 
but to the appropriateness of imprisonment with respect to the purposes it is 
designed to achieve. Thus, the Safety in Custody Statistics England and Wales, Update to 
March 2013 (Ministry of Justice 2013b) reports for a prison population of 
approximately 83,000 for the 12 months ending March 2013 there were 51 self-
inflicted deaths, 22,687 incidents of self-harm, 14,052 assaults and two homicides.  
In the light of these figures it is hard to argue that prisons are a safe place (even 
though self-inflicted deaths are down from 94 ten years previously, and suicide 
prevention policies in the early stages of imprisonment have had a marked 
beneficial impact).  But at 61 per 100,000 prisoners this compares with the general 
population rate of 8.8 per 100,000 in 2011 (National Confidential Inquiry 2013).  
Again it is important to stress that we are not exceptional here: suicide in prison is 
high everywhere, partly because criminal justice systems select into imprisonment 
those who are already members of vulnerable groups, and partly because the 
environment and context in which they come into prison exacerbates the 
likelihood of suicide; albeit 90% is by hanging which is something that ought to be 
preventable.  This enhanced rate of suicide (approximately 7 times) is comparable 
with other places internationally (Côté 2013). Moreover, as Hawton et al (2013:in 
press) note in their recent major study of self-harm in prisoners, ‘[I]n England and 
Wales, standardised mortality ratios for suicide are five times higher in male 
prisoners and 20 times higher for female inmates than in general population 
controls’.  But we are unable to know whether fluctuations in prisoner suicides are 
attributable to the numbers of people detained with mental health problems since 
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this is another area where we do not collect the relevant data so we cannot draw 
valid conclusions (see above MOJ 2013:10).  However, we do know that, aside 
from the figures on suicide, levels of self-harm amongst prisoners persist (Ministry 
of Justice 2013 a and b), self-harm amongst prisoners is substantial and it is 
associated with subsequent suicide (Hawton et al 2013).  
 
(ii) THE REMAND POPULATION 
 
Another population where arguments about manifest injustice arise concerns the 
remand population (Kemp 2013 commenting on the European Prison 
Observatory project). Since these individuals are not held for the purposes of 
punishment, we need to be very careful about holding unconvicted individuals 
with mental disorder in a prison setting, particularly given the anti-therapeutic 
nature of imprisonment. Some argue convincingly that imprisonment is harmful 
per se to an individual’s mental health (see generally the Prison Reform Trust).  
Given that on 26 July 2013 the prison population was 83,223 and there were 829 
people in immigration removal centres and the untried remand population makes 
up approximately 8.8%, this means some 7,323 people were being held pending 
trial or disposal (International Centre for Prison Studies, World Prison Briefing 
2013).  Of course, there are also arguments that we hold too many alleged 
offenders on remand – some of whom are not ultimately convicted.  Is this a 
manifest injustice? If so, it is as true for the mentally ordered as the mentally 
disordered, albeit that the mentally disordered may suffer disproportionately. The 
solution seems obvious; the provision of more bail hostels, or to hold in hospital 
those with mental disorders where such detention is merited on clinical grounds. 
The 1983 Mental Health Act provisions permitting this are arguably underused 
given the scale of disorder within the remand population. And do those with 
mental disorder find it harder to access bail hostels given that reports may need to 
be written?   
Contemporary figures on mental disorder in the remand population are even 
harder to obtain than those within the sentenced population. However, from the 
survey carried out in 1997, Singleton et al (1998:7) the authors note: 
 
When asked specific questions about their mental health, 21% of male 
remand prisoners said they had received help or treatment before entering 
prison and 15% said they had received such help or treatment since coming 
to prison. Overall, 1 in 9 male remand prisoners reported that at one time 
they had been admitted to a mental hospital or ward but rarely had stayed 
more than six months. However, 5% of the sample group had been admitted 
to a locked ward or secure unit. 
 
And as Brooker and Birmingham (2009:S3) observe, prisoners with mental 
disorders can feel very unsafe in prison.  
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(iii) KEEPING PRISONERS HUMANELY 
 
Again this is not an issue on which I will dwell.   I merely note three issues from 
recent reports by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP).8  First, that the 
physical conditions of imprisonment can be less than ideal: the report from HMP 
Bristol noted single cells continuing to be used for double occupancy, much of the 
prison being dirty and complaints of infestations of cockroaches. But it also noted 
at that of 577 prisoners held at the time of the inspection (2013: para 2.35): 
 
The prison had identified 261 prisoners who had declared some form of 
disability on reception but we were not confident that all prisoners with a 
disability had been identified. In our survey, prisoners who identified 
themselves as having a disability reported more negatively than other 
prisoners about victimisation and feeling safe. 
 
Whilst mental health services were reported as ‘good’ (2013: para S14) at the 
prison, with the 17 bed Brunel Unit ‘being used effectively for those with 
significant mental health needs’ (2013: para 2.107), questions remain about the 
general suitability of the conditions for those with mental disorder (and indeed, for 
all prisoners given the unsanitary conditions). 
Second, the lack of resources and the presence of drugs are unlikely to be 
protective towards those with mental health vulnerabilities. At the recent HMIP 
inspection at Oakwood, one in seven prisoners reported having developed a drug 
problem whilst at HMP Oakwood (p.12) yet prisoners complained about 
inadequate access to even the most basic of toiletries (p.31). 
Third, instances of inhumane treatment do occur.  Most recently, HMIP 
reported, following a visit to HMP Bronzefield, a women’s prison (2013:5): 
 
At our last inspection in 2010 we reported: 
 
The prison held a small number of ‘restricted status’ women, some of whom had severe 
personality disorders. Their needs could simply not be met by the prison. One woman, who 
had exhibited unpredictable and violent behaviour, had effectively been held in the 
segregation unit for three years with very little human contact or activity to occupy her. The 
conditions in which she was held seemed likely to lead to further psychological deterioration 
and were completely unacceptable. There was little evidence that senior staff in the Prison 
Service had oversight of women segregated for long periods to ensure their conditions were 
humane. Bronzefield is not an appropriate place for women with these needs and there was 
a lack of a national strategy to manage women with such complex demands. 
 
We were dismayed that the woman who had already been in the segregation 
unit for three years in 2010 was still there in 2013. Her cell was unkempt and 
                                                     
8 See http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/hmi-prisons, last accessed 16 January 2014. 
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squalid and she seldom left it. Although more activities had been organised 
for her and better multi-disciplinary support was available, she still had too 
little to occupy her. Her prolonged location on the segregation unit amounted 
to cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment – and we use these words 
advisedly. The treatment and conditions of other women held for long 
periods in segregation was little better. Much of this was outside the prison’s 
direct control and required a national strategy for meeting the needs of these 
very complex women – as exists in the male estate. However, Bronzefield 
itself needed to do more to ameliorate the worst effects of this national 
failure. 
 
 
 
THE PURPOSES OF IMPRISONMENT 
 
Does the presence of those with mental disorder in such high numbers in the 
prison population undermine the legitimate purposes of imprisonment?  
Conventionally, deprivation of liberty, measured out in discrete (or indefinite) 
parcels of time, constitutes the punishment that the state delivers following 
conviction where the offence is so serious that only a sentence of imprisonment 
suffices to match the offender’s misdeeds. And mere deprivation of liberty, as a 
baseline objective, can arguably be achieved regardless of the mental state of the 
detainee. 
However, the state is properly rather more ambitious in its objectives. As the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 specifies,9 when offenders are sentenced the judge must 
have regard to a number of purposes: punishment, deterrence, incapacitation and 
rehabilitation. And the act of sentencing also fulfils the wider objective of 
denunciation. But which of these measures are appropriately imposed on those 
with mental disorder?  Again this is not an easy question to answer because of the 
range and nature of the severity of the disorders experienced by those in prisons. 
And because mental disorders are not static conditions; they fluctuate over time 
making even those with more severe disorders amenable to criminal justice 
interventions at some points.  But we can probably agree on one or two starting 
points. 
First, punishment in its purest form, that is punishment without hope of any 
redemption, is unacceptable for all offenders.  The ECtHR has most recently 
expressed this in a case concerning life without parole: 
 
However, what tipped the balance for me in voting with the majority was the 
Court’s confirmation, in this judgment, that Article 3 encompasses what 
might be described as “the right to hope”. It goes no further than that. The 
                                                     
9 See above at page 3. 
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judgment recognises, implicitly, that hope is an important and constitutive 
aspect of the human person. Those who commit the most abhorrent and 
egregious of acts and who inflict untold suffering upon others, nevertheless 
retain their fundamental humanity and carry within themselves the capacity to 
change. Long and deserved though their prison sentences may be, they retain 
the right to hope that, someday, they may have atoned for the wrongs which 
they have committed. They ought not to be deprived entirely of such hope. 
To deny them the experience of hope would be to deny a fundamental aspect 
of their humanity and, to do that, would be degrading.10   
 
For those on determinate sentences criticisms of ‘punishment as retribution’ have 
significantly less purchase since such retribution has a foreseeable (and hence 
potentially proportionate) basis.  But for those on indeterminate sentences, where 
detention is reviewed after a set tariff period to determine whether the offender 
continues to pose a risk of serious offending, the incapacitative element of the 
sentence can be more problematic for those with mental disorder. Indeed, if ‘pure 
punishment’ can be regarded as degrading, this in turn raises interesting questions 
about the capacity of the person undergoing ‘punishment as retribution’ to 
understand that it is intended to have proportionate limitations. 
Second, incarceration for public protection works as well for disordered as 
ordered offenders, albeit disordered offenders are more likely to have judgements 
made about them (arguably unjustly, that is, without foundation) with respect to 
their likely dangerousness.  This is an argument that deserves a separate detailed 
analysis (see for example Szmukler and Rose 2013, Szmukler 2003, Wolff 2006).  
But, imprisonment following serious offending for the purposes of preventing 
further serious offending within a reasonable time-frame is not manifestly unjust. 
However, once we move into the territory of deterrence, denunciation and 
rehabilitation the issues become more complex. Here what is required of an 
offender is rather more than that he or she merely understands that they are being 
punished or incapacitated. These are objectives that require an element of 
interaction with the offender (that is, not simply things that are being done to 
them). And here the question of the offender’s capacity to respond comes into 
play.  Capacity is issue determined – it is not a status test. Thus, whilst one might 
have the capacity to order a black coffee whilst concurrently being aware of the 
dangers of drinking too much coffee, the same individual might not have the 
capacity to engage in a complex financial transaction – perhaps taking out an 
endowment mortgage – where the risks of so doing are not fully understood. 
Equally, offenders may have the capacity to plead guilty to an offence without 
                                                     
10 Judge Power-Forde’s concurring opinion in Vinter and others v UK (2013) Grand Chamber Judgment 
(Applications nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10) 9 July at p.53.  The reasoning echoes that of Laws LJ in 
the case of R (Wellington) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWHC 1109 (Admin) cited in 
the Vinter judgment at para 54 (albeit not subsequently followed in the UKHL). 
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necessarily having the capacity to respond appropriately to the interventions that 
follow.   
Being more definitive about this is problematic, since I am unaware of any 
research in this area.  But questions could easily be asked both at a high order of 
generality – are those with mental disorder any more deterrable than those without 
– and at a much more detailed level of specificity.  With respect to the former the 
evidence on deterrence is relatively weak and largely indicates that it is the risk of 
being caught and the potential offender’s awareness of that risk, rather than the 
punishment that follows, which deters (Hough et al 2013).  Do those with ‘mental 
disorder’ have altered perceptions with regard to the risk of being caught?  
Similarly, with respect to the latter, questions might be asked about  the capacity of 
those with severe learning disability to engage with sex offender management 
programmes or anger control courses; or depressed or psychotic offenders to 
recognise the consequences of their actions; or of personality disordered offenders 
to have the capacity to show and feel remorse; and this may have particular 
relevance not only in therapeutic settings but also with reference to a decision to 
release made by the Parole Board.  Many other such questions could be asked by 
type of disorder, not the least of which concern whether drawing such offenders 
out in group therapy sessions can risk causing harm to other offenders where staff 
are insufficiently experienced to handle the emerging disclosures.11  This is a highly 
specialised area.  All I would want to do at this point is to challenge the extent to 
which our conception of a typical offender as the subject of our penal 
philosophies fits the reality of the prison population with all of the cognitive and 
behavioural limitations prisoners display; to say nothing of the challenges that 
inadequate literacy and language difficulties must pose to our prison service.  And 
without responsiveness to these more nuanced justifications for imprisonment, it 
becomes harder to resist the notion that what we are imposing on some mentally 
disordered offenders is a form of punishment with little hope (other than that a 
proportionate time in custody will pass), whereas what we impose on other 
offenders is a more blended form of punishment.  And it is important to 
remember that on one definition of what constitutes mental disorder, mentally 
disordered offenders make up 90% of the prison population. In this context, the 
questions above about the legitimacy of some forms of punishment apply, 
logically, almost across the entire prison population. 
To recap, my argument is that it is not manifestly unjust to impose a sentence 
of imprisonment on a mentally disordered offender where that sentence has been 
preceded by a fair process of trial, or by the acceptance of an informed guilty plea. 
Proportionate deprivation of liberty as punishment is not unjust. But that what 
happens thereafter (or fails to happen thereafter) might constitute an unjust 
intervention for particular kinds of offender in particular mental states. And since 
there always are tensions between the demands of successful treatment and what is 
                                                     
11 A point made by Elaine Player. 
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required for successful release such dilemmas are likely to be writ large where 
treatment needs are more visible. These cases are perhaps most poignantly 
illustrated in those miscarriage of justice cases where offenders have refused to 
admit guilt and accordingly not been given early release, or released at all after 
their tariff has expired prior to the demonstration of a miscarriage. Of course, in 
acute states there are provisions for the transfer of offenders from prison into the 
hospital system, and this happens regularly, albeit not with the regularity or the 
speed12 that some offenders’ conditions probably merit.  The problem of 
availability of beds in the health system is an acute problem (see Bhugra 2013; 
Mental Health Foundation 2013).  
There is moreover a coherent retributivist argument that if you have the 
capacity to offend (that is, you autonomously made choices that had detrimental 
effects on others) then it is right and proper that you should suffer some 
intervention for those choices that treats you as an autonomous individual, and 
does not respond to you wholly and solely on the basis that you coincidentally 
have a mental disorder. Such an approach affords those with mental disorder the 
same dignity as those without: there is a proportionate rebalancing by the state of 
the inequalities caused by the offender. 
However, a utilitarian approach to punishment would arguably impact 
differentially on the mentally disordered offender: first because punishment may 
be ineffective if it is not understood or if there is no capacity to respond 
appropriately to the relevant measures of intervention and it may therefore be 
ineffective to impose it; and secondly because the maximisation of good may 
entail removing the mentally disordered offender to an environment where 
medicalisation – treatment of the underlying causes if there are any - may occur.   
This also requires detailed analysis (see Peay 2011) since the causal relationship 
between disorder and offending is amongst the murkiest; and it is a relationship 
made all the more problematic by the fluctuating nature of many mental disorders. 
The recent Joint Inspection report by the HM Chief Inspectors for Prisons 
and Probation (2013: 3-4) places this picture into a bleaker light.  They observe 
that many prisons ‘did not pay sufficient attention to the “offender management” 
functions, namely the rehabilitation of the prisoner and protection of the public’. 
And that lack of progress in this area ‘casts doubt about the Prison Service’s 
capacity to implement the changes required under the Transforming Rehabilitation 
Strategy designed to reduce reoffending rates, especially for short-term prisoners’. 
They called for a ‘fundamental review’. 
Finally, it is notable that the 2007 report from HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 
‘The mental health of prisoners: A thematic review of the care and support of 
prisoners with mental health needs’ has 5 main and 45 supplementary 
recommendations for change. The extent to which these proposals have been 
implemented is hard to gauge, but perhaps the time has come for the Inspectorate 
                                                     
12 A 14day time limit is now enshrined in Department of Health Guidance, although Barlett and Sandland 
(2013:389) are cautious as to its effectiveness. 
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to revisit this thematic report.  It is unarguable that the persistent presence of 
mental disorder amongst the imprisoned population challenges the capacity of the 
prison service to achieve many of its objectives.  
 
 
 
TREATMENT ISSUES 
 
(i) TREATMENT IN PRISON 
 
Rehabilitation and treatment are thorny issues. The traditional notion in penal 
terms is that rehabilitation implies a change in the individual leading to a reduction 
or cessation in/from future offending.  But does rehabilitation have a secondary 
meaning of treatment for the individual’s (mental) disorder?  If so, this may be 
particularly problematic with reference to the coercive aspects of imprisonment.  
To take an extreme example, would we regard chemical castration as a means of 
intervening in future sexual deviance as an appropriate punishment, or merely as a 
possible treatment given the full and informed consent of the offender?  And if 
the latter, would we regard it as acceptable to ask an offender to make that choice 
in conditions of detention, with the prospect of early release as a 
consequence/inducement? This would probably make some of us feel uneasy.  
But transfer the argument to those with mental disorders. When we treat those 
with personality disorder with their consent are we making bad people who do bad 
things (anti-social personality disordered individuals) less likely to be bad in the 
future (that is, by changing their essence) or merely changing their future 
behaviour? Indeed, can the two be readily distinguished? Or is reversibility the 
key? 
This in turn raises a more difficult question as to whether manifest injustice is 
an absolute or a relative concept.  Two types of discrimination can arise with 
respect to mentally disordered offenders.  The first, which is discussed further 
below, concerns a failure to provide an equivalence of mental health service to 
that which would have been provided had the prisoner not been convicted. This 
arguably makes punishment unjust in its nature: that is, it impacts more harshly on 
vulnerable mentally disordered offenders because of the further damage that may 
be done to their mental health or by the failure to remedy what might otherwise be 
remedied in the community.   
But this kind of discrimination cuts equally against other identifiable groups; 
for example the literature on the impact of punishment by imprisonment 
documents the various ways in which characteristics that the individual has – old 
age, youth and gender can all in turn make numerically identical punishments 
unequal in their impact.  These characteristics thus become a basis for mitigating 
sentence lengths, given offences of similar levels of seriousness.  And the 
Sentencing Guidelines recognise such characteristics, including the presence of 
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mental illness, as a legitimate basis for adjusting the severity of punishment.  So 
perhaps here, the mentally disordered, or at least that subset with mental illness or 
disability, are treated equally insofar as is possible (see below).  
 
(ii) TREATMENT IN HOSPITAL 
 
The second kind of discrimination arises out of an arguable medicalisation of 
criminality which does not, and cannot, apply to those offenders who do not have 
mental disorders.  The argument arises in this way.  Those with mental disorder 
with capacity cannot be treated against their will in a prison setting. This would be 
exactly the same situation for mentally ordered offenders. However, mentally 
disordered offenders can be transferred to hospital, against their will, where they 
can be treated against their will under the terms of the Mental Health Act 1983. 
This is particularly important: treatment without consent in a prison setting is 
not permitted (prisoners must be transferred to a mental health hospital if 
compulsory treatment for their mental disorders is to be undertaken).  In stark 
contrast, those who refuse physical treatment cannot be treated in prison until 
they lose capacity – and even then treatment would have to be in their best 
interests taking into account their known former wishes about the treatment.   
Once transferred to hospital, mentally disordered offenders are subject to the 
same discrimination that affects all compulsorily detained mental patients; that is 
treatment can be imposed on capacitous individuals.  This is an issue that was 
addressed by the Richardson Committee in 1998.  And this argument perhaps cuts 
most deeply with respect to the detention of offenders with anti-social personality 
disorder reaching the very end of a determinate sentence, who are then transferred 
to hospital on the grounds of the nature of their underlying disorder, but with an 
eye to providing a secure environment to prevent the realisation of a predicted 
risk.  This is not an argument I intend to explore further here. Suffice it to say that 
these late transfers have become more of a problem since the Mental Health Act 
definition of mental disorder was extended so as to include those with personality 
disorder.  Such transfers cannot, by definition, extend to those without mental 
disorder. This is a tricky argument to pursue since ostensibly transfer is on the 
grounds of medical necessity (and is accordingly not discriminatory but 
advantageous). However, the question arises as to why, if medical necessity is 
made out, the transfer did not occur earlier in the sentence?  And there are further 
questions about the viability of the treatment and the likelihood of its success 
where personality disorder is the principal diagnosis. And, of course, in the 
absence of treatment success the detention can, under the Mental Health Act, last 
indefinitely. 
 
(iii) COERCION 
 
Another issue concerns the vulnerability of prisoners to treatment coercion.  
Coercion arising out of the need to be seen to be co-operative where parole is in 
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prospect applies equally to the mentally disordered and the mentally ordered 
offender.  Prison is an inherently coercive environment and prisoners engage in all 
sorts of activities they may not otherwise choose to engage in (e.g. attending sex 
offender treatment courses or anger management or doing jobs compliantly) 
because they may believe it enhances the prospect of release.  But treatment 
coercion can be seen as greater for the mentally disordered offender where the 
backdrop of explicit coercion under the Mental Health Act exists. 
To what extent is treatment given in prison with consent obtained under 
coercion? Does taking anti-psychotic medication, which has known adverse effects 
(obesity, impotence, etc., Zigmond 2011) represent a step change in the effects of 
coercion constituting a manifest injustice? Certainly the General Medical Council 
(2008:19) is alive to this difficulty in its advice to doctors on ensuring that 
decisions are voluntary in paragraphs 41-42:  
 
41. Patients may be put under pressure by employers, insurers, relatives or 
others, to accept a particular investigation or treatment. You should be aware 
of this and of other situations in which patients may be vulnerable. Such 
situations may be, for example, if they are resident in a care home, subject to 
mental health legislation, detained by the police or immigration services, or in 
prison.  
 
42. You should do your best to make sure that such patients have considered 
the available options and reached their own decision. If they have a right to 
refuse treatment, you should make sure that they know this and are able to 
refuse if they want to.  
 
Put more simply, prison is a coercive environment and one which is not obviously 
compatible with voluntary engagement with treatment.  Indeed, since it is already 
known (Burns et al 2011) that ‘leverage’ amongst mental health populations exists, 
how much more likely is it to occur in an imprisoned population? We do not 
know the answer.  
This is potentially a classic area of discrimination – and one which the 
Richardson Committee attempted to address back in 1999; whilst there are no 
formal legal powers to treat the mentally disordered in prison that do not apply to 
the mentally ordered (the discrimination Richardson was addressing was largely 
with respect to civil powers for treating those with mental health problems, and to 
offenders who are sent to hospital rather than prison), the coercive aspects do 
have a different impact on the mentally ordered and mentally disordered. 
Richardson concluded that it would be inappropriate to extend compulsory 
powers to a prison environment; but coercion is much more difficult to regulate. 
The medicalisation of criminality may represent another injustice, but an injustice 
which may not be readily manifest.  Medicalisation, both before and after 
sentence, exposes mentally disordered offenders to both the benefits and perils of 
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psychotropic drugs; and their mixed therapeutic effects are contested (see Burns 
2013, Davies 2013 and, for a perspective from a former drug user, Self 2013). 
This argument can, of course, be turned on its head.  Imprisoning the 
mentally disordered can be seen, as has been argued above, as a denial of 
treatment opportunities because treatment cannot be given without consent in a 
prison setting.  Whilst one might argue (and I have above) that this puts mentally 
ordered and mentally disordered offenders on the same footing, one might also 
argue that it is the very nature of mental disorder which may contribute to 
treatment resistance. Thus, those with mental disorder may be less likely to comply 
with medical recommendations for treatment.  Moreover, if, as Dressing and 
Salize assert when reviewing the international context, the proportions of mentally 
disordered prison inmates are rising, then the disadvantage experienced also 
arguably increases: in this context they quote (2009:802) the observations of the 
World Health Organisation:  
 
One of the difficulties in keeping mentally ill offenders out of prison is that 
many countries do not have appropriate facilities to house people regarded as 
criminal and dangerous. As a result, those with mental disorders are not only 
forced to stay in prison, but are also deprived of the necessary treatment there 
(WHO 2005, p.5). 
 
Dressing and Salize are appropriately cautious about the reasons behind this rise, 
and consider the possible explanatory factors as including issues of 
deinstitutionalisation from community based facilities (that is the closure of the 
asylums and their successors), the failure of community care to replace in-patient 
psychiatric beds, and ‘a tendency to shift non-compliant or mentally ill violent 
patients towards forensic psychiatric settings or the prison system’ (2009:802).  
Whether these apply equally in this country is unclear since we do not even have 
clear data on the make-up of the mentally disordered prison population over time, 
so it is impossible to say whether it has risen or not.  All we know is that it is 
consistently disproportionately high by comparison with the levels of disorder in 
the community. 
 
 
 
REMEDIES 
 
What might be done about this? 
 
1. It would be a mistake to think of this solely as a problem of 
imprisonment; the decision to imprison is only one of a series of decisions in the 
criminal justice system, so the solution might lie elsewhere. For example, effective 
pre-trial diversion or post release maintenance of support, care and medication for 
those who might otherwise return to prison through further offending could have 
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greater preventive impact (see the Bradley Report 2009; Scott et al 201313). Prisons 
are not exceptional in being places where those with mental disorder are detained 
in inappropriate conditions: police cells are another notable example (HMIC 
2013).14  The recent announcement of a £25 million post Bradly pilot placing 
mental health nurses in police stations and courts in an endeavour to ensure such 
individuals receive needed treatment and to reduce further reoffending is thus 
much to be welcomed.15 
 
2. Andrew Ashworth’s proposal from his 2012 ‘What If…?’ lecture should 
be adopted.  He argues that we send to prison those for whom prison is a 
disproportionate punishment.  If we did not send non-violent property offenders16 
to prison but found some form of community intervention and/or reparative 
measures then we could reduce the prison population overnight. Ashworth (2013: 
12) calculates that this would affect 20,000 offenders convicted of theft or 
handling at the reception stage, 5,000 for fraud and 1,000 for criminal damage, 
leading to a reduction in the sentenced population of 8% for male prisoners and 
21% for female offenders. And because mentally disordered offenders commit 
broadly the same kinds of offences they populate equally the categories at the 
lower end of seriousness. This is not an argument based on exceptionalism: it 
simply recognises that if it is disproportionate to send mentally ordered offenders 
to prison for offences of property like theft, handling and fraud, then it is likewise 
disproportionate to do so for mentally disordered offenders. 
 
3. The logic of the argument on the failure of prisons to fulfil their wider 
objectives argues in favour not only of reducing particular categories of prisoner, 
but also in favour of significantly reducing the use of imprisonment per se.  As 
idealistic as this may sound there is a long history of support for such an approach 
(see e.g. Hudson 1987, Mathiesen 2006) and, more recently, empirical evidence 
which could lead to rethinking the balance between community and penal options 
(Hough et al 2013). 
 
4. Mental condition defences and provisions for unfitness to plead are 
currently very narrow. The numbers with severe mental illness or severe learning 
disability in prisons would suggest that these narrow rules may not be being 
                                                     
13 A meta analysis of 6,571 studies from 1980-2012. Although only ten studies met the inclusion criteria, 
they were effective in identifying offenders and had positive criminal justice and mental health outcomes. 
Effectiveness depended on the model of service delivery, the availability of community service and 
engagement of offenders with treatment. 
14 Whilst police stations should only be used on an ‘exceptional’ basis for those with mental health needs, 
the report observed that all the evidence indicated that police stations continued to be used on a regular 
basis with more than 9,000 detentions under s.136 in 2011/12. 
15 See http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/04/mental-health-nurses-police-stations-pilot-
scheme, last accessed on 16 January 2014. 
16 The proposal relates primarily to theft and fraud offences; burglary is discounted because it is intended 
to violate the right to privacy.  
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applied as they should be (Peay 2010). The Law Commission are currently 
examining both areas (see above) although there is little overt political enthusiasm 
for reform. But it is just that we should be more ambitious here.  As the Law 
Commission argue, we should not punish those who are not criminally responsible 
– that is, those who did not have the capacity to be held criminally responsible at 
the point of their offending;17 although it is notable that in its further discussion 
paper the Commission would seemingly require a complete breakdown or absence 
of capacity for normal human rationality or self-control. In asking whether the 
individual had the capacity to choose otherwise the Commission would be both 
extending the ambit of insanity whilst coincidentally keeping its threshold very 
high (Law Commission 2013). In any event such a finding of lack of capacitous 
offending would not be compatible with imprisonment, since it would not 
constitute a conviction. 
Although not the subject of this paper it should be noted that the majority of 
criminal cases are resolved via guilty pleas. Guilty pleas emanating from those 
arguably lacking the capacity to make them would be a problem. Our current rules 
on unfitness to plead (Peay 2010) are not based on an assessment of incapacity. 
This would entail an inability to understand and retain relevant information, 
including the reasonably foreseeable consequences of making the decision to plead 
guilty, or of making no decision, to use and weigh the relevant information, to 
retain that information, albeit only for a short period, and to communicate the 
decision made.  Thus, it is possible that a number of those currently in prison have 
had their pleas accepted on an unjust, albeit not an illegal, basis.  
 
5. Diversion at the point of sentence under the Mental Health Act 1983 is a 
remarkably underutilised option. For example, of offenders sent to prison in 2008, 
of whom there were 100,348 (MOJ 2012), only 735 received hospital disposals,18 a 
mere 0.73%. Yet, as the figures above reveal, some 3,612 people sentenced to 
imprisonment that year would have most probably had some kind of functional 
psychotic disorder19 And those figures do not take account of all the other 
individuals suffering from neurotic disorders, depression, personality disorder, 
those with co-occurring drug and alcohol addictions or those with a severe 
learning disability.  There is thus arguably a considerable underutilisation of 
hospital disposals at the point of sentence. Quite why this is again remains subject 
to further exploration as the research base is now somewhat outdated (see 
Richardson 1993, Laing 1999). Similarly, the use of community orders with a 
mental health requirement attached under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is also a 
much neglected sentencing option (Seymour and Rutherford 2008). 
                                                     
17 See Law Commission Scoping Paper (2012: para 2.73). They assert it would be ‘fundamentally unfair 
and unjust to hold someone criminally responsible for their conduct if, through no fault of their own, 
they lacked the capacity to obey the law’.  
18 This figure comprises 343 s.37/41 (MOJ 2008) and 392 s.37 – DoH (2009); the figures are not exact as 
the two figures do not cover precisely similar periods.  
19 Caution should be exercised here as this compares the sentenced population with the detained 
population, but it does use the more conservative European figures on levels of disorder.   
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6. Mitigation: both utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment could 
appropriately lead to adjusted measures of punishment (or, indeed, no punishment 
at all) for mentally disordered offenders. This would be based on their variable 
potential to respond to punitive interventions or rehabilitative ones, or their 
capacity to be held partially responsible for their offending, were the criminal law 
to recognise such a concept beyond the bounds of diminished responsibility 
manslaughter.  The Sentencing Council’s Guideline on Seriousness (2004: para 
1.25) does point to mental illness or disability as one of the general bases for 
mitigation; the question is, should more allowance be made given the relationship 
between the psychological state of the offender and the purposes of 
imprisonment? It is also possible that restorative justice opportunities might be 
unjustly denied to those offenders with mental disorder who are perceived to be 
unlikely to be able to participate in such schemes (or where victims might be less 
enthusiastic).  Indeed, the psychopathically disordered offender, who may be 
constitutionally unable to experience remorse or express empathy, or who may be 
unusually skilled at exploiting and manipulating victims in such situations because 
he or she is able to read others’ emotions well, causes further difficulties for such 
schemes.  And some of the international evidence suggests these are the offenders 
who are most quickly ejected by services.20  Whether such treatment, or indeed 
denial of access to such services, constitutes discrimination is unclear: but 
discrimination is unlawful on the grounds of both mental disability, and learning 
disability and difficulties (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2010) and 
under the UNCRPD. 
Again these arguments are difficult to make where commentators are not in 
the position of the sentencing judge who hears all of the evidence and is able to 
witness the behaviour of the offender in court.  That said, our sentencing 
provisions do not always do justice to the individual circumstances of particular 
offenders. For example, those found guilty of murder, because they were found 
responsible for the offence at the point of the offence, will have to go to prison in 
the first instance even if their mental health has subsequently deteriorated. It is a 
legal requirement that those convicted of murder receive a life sentence of 
imprisonment and go to prison in the first instance, albeit those who are seriously 
ill at the point of sentence should be transferred rapidly.  But offenders whose 
capacity may fall something short of full, but who are nonetheless convicted, may 
not benefit from any allowance for their underlying disorders.  One such example 
might be the case of Nicola Edgington who was sentenced to life imprisonment 
with a minimum tariff of 37 years, despite having repeatedly called the police prior 
to her offences warning them that she felt she was, in effect, out of control (see 
                                                     
20 A symposium at the International Association of Forensic Mental Health Services Conference in 
Maastricht in June 2013 explored some of these issues: see Assessment and Treatment of Psychopathy in Dutch 
Forensic Clinical Practice, a paper presented by Evelyn Klein Haneveld, Wineke Smid, Edwin Wever, Inge 
Breukel, Vivienne de Vogel, Jeantine Stam and Michiel de Vries Robbé. 
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IPCC report 2013 and Judge’s sentencing remarks21). The sentence was upheld on 
appeal, albeit by that time Edgington had been transferred to Rampton Special 
Hospital under the Mental Health Act 1983.22 
 
7. Transfer to hospital:  Given the spectrum of severity of unmet mental 
health needs in prison it is inevitable that some prisoners are detained in prison 
when they ought to be transferred to hospital. In 2005 it was argued that some 
2,100 to 3,700 prisoners were likely to present with sufficiently acute mental health 
needs that they ought to be transferred to hospital (Rickford and Edgar 2005:44).23  
However, bed capacity within the NHS would not make such transfers remotely 
possible.  Delays in transfer result, making the detention of these individuals in the 
absence of appropriate treatment facilities arguably unjust. The need for greater 
provision is self-evident.  Moreover, having the power to transfer only those 
prisoners to mental health care on a compulsory basis who lacked the capacity to 
consent to hospital admission and treatment would free-up hospital beds currently 
occupied by offender-patients with various forms of personality disorder who 
retain capacity (see Szmukler et al 2010) who would otherwise be held in prison. 
 
8. One argument that bears some consideration concerns the conditions in 
which prisoners are held – conditions which may either actively exacerbate their 
health problems or conditions where their existing health problems do not receive 
the standard of care they would get were they not subject to imprisonment. With 
regard to the former the regime which imprisonment necessarily entails (or entails 
under our currents forms of imprisonment) is unlikely to foster the conditions 
which will enhance recovery – privacy, the maintenance of supportive social 
networks, and certainty about one’s future prospects.24 But these apply to all 
offenders regardless of their pre-existing vulnerabilities. With regard to the latter, 
if it were true then it could validly be argued that imprisoning such offenders 
would constitute an injustice: the punishment entailed in a prison sentence is 
supposed to be the deprivation of liberty, and not a further detriment to the health 
of the individual through lack of access to services.  This argument is largely no 
longer contentious, and in April 2006 prison health care was transferred to the 
NHS.25  However, in a recent study of mental health in-reach services in England 
                                                     
21 Available at 
http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDIQFjAA
&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.judiciary.gov.uk%2FResources%2FJCO%2FDocuments%2FJudgments%
2Fsentencing-remarks-r-v-
edgington.pdf&ei=6R4WUrm2FqOy7Abv_oHQCw&usg=AFQjCNEdHHIEJSpImu-
zg8SQBtCuTGFM9Q&bvm=bv.51156542,d.ZGU, last accessed on 16 January 2014. 
22 R v Edgington (2013) EWCA Crim 2185. 
23 Drawing on estimates compiled by Dr Adrian Grounds. 
24 I am grateful to Dr Tim Exworthy for this point. 
25 See also the Council of Europe’s 2006 European Prisons Rule, available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=955747, last accessed on 16 January 2014, and the Equality Act 
2010.   
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and Wales, Tim Exworthy and his colleagues (Forrester et al 2013) concluded that 
although provision has improved over the last 10-12 years,  
 
mental health in-reach services still fall far short of community equivalence 
and there is wide variation in service arrangements that cannot be explained 
by prison size or function (2013:326). 
 
Indeed, in some prisons, albeit largely low security establishments, there was no 
mental health in-reach team at all. Thus, equivalence of health care remains a 
policy aspiration and does not reflect the reality of care in all prisons.  Tim 
Exworthy has argued that what is required is an AAAQ approach – health care 
that is 'available, accessible, acceptable and of good quality' (Exworthy et al 2011). 
Lines (2006) has similarly argued that what is required is not equivalence of 
standards but equivalence of objectives and outcomes. This is pertinent since one 
might argue that it is manifestly unjust to provide equivalence of care (that is X 
number of nurses per 1,000 of population) when the need is much greater among 
a given population.  As Forrester et al (2013:332) observe, the Sainsbury Centre 
has calculated that spending provision in prison is currently up to 4-7 times greater 
than in the community per head, but it ought to be up to 20 times greater given 
the level of documented prisoner needs. Exworthy et al (2012) have argued that 
this is not just a question of resources, but of a need for enforceable standards 
including a right to the highest attainable standard of health.   
Finally, I accept that for some offenders a sentence of imprisonment might 
provide an opportunity to access both mental and physical health services that 
were not accessed in the community (Byng et al 2012) or not provided in the 
community; this is notably the case for Black and Ethnic Minority Offenders and 
for men with depression (HM Inspectorate of Prisons 2007). But whilst it may be 
advantageous for such groups to gain access to services via prison, it is unjust for 
others to be denied access as a result of imprisonment.  There is a difference 
between failing to access something that was available in the community but is 
available in prison, and being unable to access something that is available in the 
community, but to which access is denied by reason of imprisonment. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Many prisoners perceive themselves to be unjustly convicted. By definition, they 
will also consider themselves unjustly punished. Whether we should objectively 
have greater concerns about the position of mentally disordered offenders in 
prison, with respect to the justness of their circumstances and location there, 
regardless of the justness of their convictions, has been the subject of this paper.   
Imprisoning the mentally disordered can be a manifest injustice, but whether it is 
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depends upon the circumstances in which their conviction came about, what kind 
and severity of mental disorder the prisoner is suffering from, what treatment is 
available in the prison for their disorder, and whether they are able to give 
voluntary (non-coerced, fully informed) consent to that treatment.  There are also 
questions about the legitimacy of a sentence of imprisonment (which apply both 
to the mentally ordered and mentally disordered offender, but which have much 
greater purchase with respect to those with mental disorder) in the light of an 
individual offender's capacity to respond to the overarching purposes of 
imprisonment.  Where that capacity is limited, as it is in many cases, questions can 
be asked about the justness of imprisonment. 
There is no easy solution to this. It is clearly not a question of just moving 
mentally disordered people out of prisons and into hospital: this is too superficial a 
response and one too frequently made by those who are asked to respond to the 
problems of an overcrowded and rising prison population.  And in any event, for a 
proportion of mentally disordered offenders prison is the right, proper and 
proportionate sentence for them – they are justly in prison. 
Despite the occasional political pronouncements about mentally disordered 
prisoners it is overly optimistic to assume that there is any great political will in 
this area to change matters; the persistence of the problem defies such optimism.  
The Bradley Review (2009) has almost certainly had a beneficial impact with its 
clear restatement of longstanding government policy that mentally disordered 
offenders with acute mental health problems should be diverted away from the 
criminal justice system; and with its emphasis on securing access to services 
wherever they are located. But asserting an objective and putting it into practice 
are a gulf apart. Mentally disordered offenders are not a constituent group who 
agitate for their needs (albeit they have more capacity to agitate than those with 
mentally illnesses in civil detention); and they are not a group for whom agitation 
by others is easy. The best efforts of the Law Commission to engage and continue 
to engage with the areas of both unfitness to plead and the law of insanity and 
automatism are to be applauded, but whether any parliamentary time would be 
made available if firm proposals were to emerge is doubtful. Similarly, a number of 
judicial initiatives to enhance the prospects of a fair trial for those of questionable 
capacity have been most welcome.  
Part of the problem derives, as Dressing and Salize (2009: 807) observe from 
their survey of 24 countries in the EU and EFTA, from a failure to document the 
nature and extent of the imprisonment of those with mental disorder: 
 
None of the included countries provides regular national statistics on the 
frequency of mental disorders of prisoners or on the availability or frequency 
of psychiatric treatments.  
 
In England and Wales admission screening takes place, and there is assessment on 
release by a general physician, but this is insufficient properly to diagnose and 
estimate the prevalence of mental disorder in prison. Perhaps everyone familiar 
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with the system accepts it is widespread and thus there is no impetus fully and 
repeatedly to document the problem.  Yet there is widespread agreement that  
 
substance abuse, personality disorders and chronic psychotic disorders are 
found more frequently in prisoners than in the general population. The 
restriction of freedom, the prison setting in general or specific environmental 
factors in prison are potential mental health hazards. In particular, the early 
phases of imprisonment must be recognized as periods of high vulnerability 
(2009:809). 
 
For many mentally disordered offenders imprisonment is not a manifest injustice, 
yet for some it is.  And it is certainly an affront to our common notions of justice 
that this situation persists. HM Chief Inspectors of Prisons and Probation have 
called for a ‘fundamental review’ with respect to short term prisoners.26  Perhaps it 
is time for a review of the purposes and efficacy of imprisonment itself. 
 
  
                                                     
26 See above at p.13. 
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